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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 











FRANKLIN J. TENNIS, SUPERINTENDENT;  
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA;  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 09-cv-01916) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 24, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 29, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Craig Saunders appeals the District Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, arguing that the Pennsylvania state courts and the District Court erred in rejecting 
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his claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  We will affirm. 
I 
 
Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we 
recount only the essential facts and procedural history. 
In September 2004, Saunders was tried and convicted in Pennsylvania state court 
on one count of conspiracy to commit escape of a prisoner.  The Honorable Renee 
Cardwell Hughes presided over his trial.  During jury selection, the prosecution and the 
defense each received nine peremptory strikes to be used during the selection of the 
twelve-juror panel and one peremptory strike to be used during the selection of two 
alternate jurors.  After several individuals in the initial forty-person venire were stricken 
for cause, remaining candidates were questioned individually.  When individual voir dire 
concluded, the proceedings went off the record and the parties took turns exercising their 
peremptory strikes. 
After the prosecutor had exercised eight of his nine peremptory strikes, defense 
counsel objected that the prosecutor was discriminating against African-American women 
in violation of Batson.  Of the twenty-five jurors who were not stricken for cause, thirteen 
were African-American women.  At the time of Saunders’s objection, every one of the 
prosecutor’s exercised strikes had been used to remove an African-American woman 
from the venire.  At that point, ten jurors had been selected: four African-American 
women, three white women, two African-American males, and one white male. 
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There is substantial uncertainty regarding what occurred after Saunders’s 
objection.  The trial record reflects only the following ruling by the state court:  
COURT: [Y]ou do understand that you cannot make out a Batson[] [challenge] 
if there are four African American women on the panel.  And that is the 
dominant racial demographic on the panel. . . .  
 
 . . . . 
 
 . . . If there was [sic] no African American females seated on this panel, you 
can [sic] rightfully say the Commonwealth has stricken a particular class.  But 
. . . there have been four African American females that the Commonwealth 
agreed to place on the panel, and at least one other African American female 
the Commonwealth desires who was stricken by the Defense. 
 
 . . . So at this point, I cannot deem that you’ve made out a Batson[] claim.  
The Commonwealth is not required to respond.  But your objection is noted for 
the record. 
 
(App. 171.)  The parties agree that the prosecutor never justified his peremptory strikes on 
the record, but there are other indications that he offered race-neutral explanations off the 
record. 
 In Judge Hughes’s opinion rejecting Saunders’s post-trial Batson motion, she 
wrote: 
The Commonwealth did strike eight (8) African American females during the 
voir dire process and provided a race neutral basis for each strike.  The 
Commonwealth’s position was further supported by the fact that of the ten 
jurors chosen, four (4) were African American females.  These four were the 
dominant race and gender of the panel.  Given that African American females 
comprised the majority group on the panel and each strike exercised by the 
Commonwealth was race neutral, the appellant has no viable claim of 
purposeful discrimination.  Appellant’s Batson challenge fails as he cannot 
make out a prima facie case showing that the circumstances created an 





(App. 504 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).)  Although Judge Hughes’s opinion 
purported to cite to pages in the trial transcript containing the prosecutor’s race-neutral 
explanations, the referenced pages contain no such record.  Nevertheless, the fact that the 
prosecutor at some point provided race-neutral reasons for his strikes is corroborated by 
both a certificate filed by Judge Hughes with the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2245 and the prosecutor’s testimony at a subsequent federal evidentiary hearing. 
 At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor testified that the parties and Judge 
Hughes discussed the Batson challenge for ten to fifteen minutes in the robing room with 
no court reporter present.  According to the prosecutor, defense counsel restated the 
Batson objection, both sides presented race-neutral reasons for their strikes, and the court 
reviewed the race and gender of each stricken and seated juror.  The prosecutor claimed 
he struck the eight African-American women primarily pursuant to his general jury-
selection philosophies disfavoring social workers and psychiatrists, as well as former 
arrestees and their relatives and friends, and preferring law enforcement personnel, public 
employees, victims of crime, older jurors, and those born and raised outside of 
Philadelphia. 
   Judge Hughes’s § 2245 certificate stated that she asked both sides to explain their 
strikes at a sidebar and that the prosecutor “gave unequivocal, race-neutral explanations 
for each of his peremptory challenges.”  (App. 328.)  The certificate also reiterated the 
5 
 
basis for the Batson ruling: 
After considering the facts and the responses of counsel, including the fact that 
the majority of the jurors selected at the time of the motion were African-
American and of that number, exactly half of the jury was comprised of 
African-American women, I concluded that neither side was engaging in race-
based strikes, and that objecting counsel had failed to establish a prima facie 
showing of discrimination. 
 
When I returned to the bench, I formally recited on the record, the race and 
gender of each juror stricken by the prosecutor and the racial composition of 
the eight jurors who had been chosen prior to the motion . . . in order to ensure 
that the defendants understood from me why the motion was not being 





 After the Court ruled from the bench, the prosecutor sought to state his race-
neutral reasons on the record.  But the Court demurred: “Having determined that the 
defense had not demonstrated a prima facie case . . . there was no need for [the 
prosecutor] to restate his reasons for striking the jurors.”  (App. 328.)  When jury 
selection resumed, the prosecutor opted not to use his ninth peremptory strike. 
 After his post-trial motions were denied, Saunders raised his Batson claim pro se 
on direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  Finding that “a portion of the 
discussion regarding [Saunders’s] Batson claim apparently occurred ‘off the record’” and 
noting that “[t]he certified record contains nothing more than the trial court identifying 
the race and gender of the potential jurors who were struck by the parties,” the 
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Pennsylvania Superior Court summarily found “no abuse of discretion” by the trial court. 
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 946 A.2d 776, 782–84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Saunders’s request for an appeal.  Commonwealth v. 
Saunders, 958 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 2008).  Saunders then filed a habeas petition under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
on May 4, 2009. 
 After the case proceeded to federal court, Magistrate Judge Timothy Rice held an 
evidentiary hearing to develop the record regarding Saunders’s Batson claim.  As 
described above, the prosecutor testified regarding the trial proceedings surrounding 
Saunders’s Batson claim and the prosecution’s justifications for striking eight African-
American women from the jury pool.  The Magistrate Judge found that Judge Hughes had 
ended her inquiry at the prima facie stage of the Batson inquiry, citing her statements at 
trial, her post-trial opinion, and her § 2245 certificate.  He disregarded her § 2245 
certificate, finding that she offered inconsistent explanations for her Batson ruling, her 
decision was based on unsupported facts and inaccurate statements of the law, and her 
description of the off-the-record Batson discussion was implausible and inconsistent with 
the prosecutor’s testimony.  The Magistrate Judge further concluded that Judge Hughes’s 
determination that the prosecutor’s strike pattern failed to create an inference of 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Judge Hughes’s assertion in her § 2245 certificate that only eight jurors had been 
chosen for the final panel at the time of Saunders’s Batson objection contradicts the trial 
record, which shows that ten jurors had been seated at that time.  (See App. 171.) 
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discrimination sufficient to establish a prima facie Batson claim was contrary to clearly 
established Supreme Court precedent.  Therefore, he accorded no deference to Judge 
Hughes’s decision and proceeded to determine de novo whether Saunders’s Batson claim 
was meritorious at step three based on the plausibility of the prosecutor’s race-neutral 
explanations for his strikes.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that Saunders’s Batson 
claim ultimately failed because “the evidence . . . [did] not establish that the 
Commonwealth engaged in purposeful discrimination against African-American and/or 
female jurors.”  (App. 357.)  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that 
Saunders’s habeas petition be denied. 
 In a comprehensive forty-three page opinion, the District Court likewise concluded 
that Saunders’s habeas petition should be denied because his Batson claim failed.  In that 
opinion, the District Court disagreed with the Magistrate Judge regarding the weight to be 
given to Judge Hughes’s certificate and the extent of her Batson analysis at trial.  
Affording the § 2245 certificate the presumption of correctness generally applied to state 
court findings under § 2254(e)(1) and finding “nothing in the record to contradict Judge 
Hughes’s statement that [the prosecutor] gave ‘unequivocal, race neutral explanations for 
each of his peremptory challenges’ in the off the record conversation,” the District Court 
found that Judge Hughes had proceeded through a full, three-step Batson analysis at trial, 
albeit only implicitly and largely off the record.  Saunders v. Tennis, No. 09-1916, 2011 
WL 2117559, at *10, *13–14 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2011).  Therefore, although the District 
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Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge that Judge Hughes had “incorrectly interpreted 
Batson at trial” and in her post-trial opinion with respect to Saunders’s prima facie 
burden, id. at *11–12, the District Court applied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and affirmed the state-court determination that 
“Saunders did not meet his burden of showing that purposeful racial discrimination, and 
not the proffered explanation[s], actually motivated the prosecutor’s conduct,” id. at *15. 
Nevertheless, the District Court also conducted a thorough de novo analysis of the 
plausibility of the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications, ultimately reaching the same 
conclusion as the Magistrate Judge: “[W]hile the pattern of strikes and other statistical 
evidence was sufficient to meet Saunders’s[] burden at step one, Saunders has failed to 
meet his steps two and three burden of persuasion to establish that the Commonwealth 
exercised its peremptory strikes based on discriminatory motivation.”  Id. at *16–17. 
 The District Court granted a certificate of appealability on Saunders’s Batson 
claim—specifically as to the degree of deference owed to Judge Hughes’s § 2245 
certificate and whether the prosecutor “exercised [his] peremptory strikes in a racially 
discriminatory manner in violation of Batson” (App. 3)—and Saunders timely appealed.2 
II 
 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus, and 
we review its factual findings for clear error.  United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 
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(3d Cir. 2008).   Under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we may not grant Saunders habeas 
relief unless the state court’s Batson ruling was “contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of clearly established Supreme Court law, or . . . involve[d] an unreasonable 
determination of the facts.”  Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2)). 
A 
 
 It is well-established under Batson that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to strike a 
prospective juror solely on account of race.”  Holloway, 355 F.3d at 719 (citing Batson, 
476 U.S. at 88).  The Batson analysis proceeds in three steps: 
First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima 
facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the 
basis of race.  Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the 
prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in 
question.  Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason, 
“[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is 
persuasive, or even plausible”; so long as the reason is not inherently 
discriminatory, it suffices.  Third, the court must then determine whether the 
defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.  This 
final step involves evaluating “the persuasiveness of the justification” 
proffered by the prosecutor, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding 
racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” 
 
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (citations omitted) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 
514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995) (per curiam)); accord Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254, and 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). 
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251–52 (2005).  At the third step, “something more than a ‘terse,’ ‘abrupt’ comment that 
the prosecutor has satisfied Batson” is required.  Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 289 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
 Saunders argues—and both the Magistrate Judge and the District Court found— 
that the state court’s step-one determination that Saunders failed to demonstrate a prima 
facie case was contrary to Batson.  We agree.  First, the state court unreasonably applied 
Batson when it rejected Saunders’s objection on the basis that four African-American 
women had been selected for the jury, making African-American women the best-
represented demographic on the panel.  Batson makes clear that “the State’s privilege to 
strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges” is restricted by the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, “a 
prosecutor’s purposeful discrimination in excluding even a single juror on account of race 
cannot be tolerated . . . [and] a prosecutor . . . can find no refuge in having accepted 
other[] venirepersons of that race for the jury.”  Holloway, 355 F.3d at 720.  Second, the 
prosecutor’s pattern of striking eight African-American women in a row, thus using all of 
his strikes exercised at that point to remove African-American women, was clearly 
sufficient to satisfy Saunders’s step-one burden.  See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (noting 
that a pattern of strikes against black jurors can create an inference of discrimination); 
Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 215 (3d Cir. 2011) (use of 85% of peremptory strikes to 
eliminate African-Americans was sufficient); Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 225, 235 (3d 
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Cir. 2005) (use of thirteen out of fourteen strikes against African-American jurors was 
“alone sufficient to establish a prima facie case”); see also Williams, 637 F.3d at 214 
(noting that step one “is not intended to be particularly onerous”). 
Because we conclude that Saunders satisfied his step-one burden by objecting on 
the basis of the prosecutor’s use of eight out of eight strikes against African-American 
women, it would have been “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” Batson for 
the state court to end its inquiry there.  Bond, 539 F.3d at 264; Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 
F.3d 246, 259 (3d Cir. 2004).  The parties dispute whether that occurred, however, and 
the Magistrate Judge and the District Court likewise disagree.3  Relatedly, the parties 
dispute the degree of deference owed to Judge Hughes’s § 2245 certificate, which could 
inform the factual determination of whether she ruled on Saunders’s Batson claim at step 
one or proceeded to steps two and three.  Indeed, the District Court found that the 
Magistrate Judge did not sufficiently defer to the certificate.4  If the state court failed to 
                                                 
3 Our precedents confirm the difficulty of gleaning from ambiguous state trial 
court rulings which Batson steps were performed.  See Bond, 539 F.3d at 268 (finding 
that the state trial court’s post-trial explanation of its Batson ruling showed it conducted a 
step-three analysis, curing its “inartful[]” statements at trial suggesting that it stopped at 
step two); Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 256 (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first 
conflated steps one and two and then “proceeded to step three, only to conclude that 
Hardcastle had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, thus indicating 
that, technically speaking, its analysis never proceeded beyond step one”). 
 
4 The degree of deference owed to a state judge’s § 2245 certificate is an open 
question.  See Weidner v. Thieret, 932 F.2d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Where state trial 
judges fail to adequately develop the relevant facts so that not even implicit findings can 
be gleaned from the record, the habeas procedure is better served by a de novo hearing 
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conduct either step two or three, “we would not apply AEDPA deference” to its Batson 
ruling and “would review the issue de novo.”  Bond, 539 F.3d at 264.  The 
Commonwealth also contends that the evidentiary hearing was improper under both 
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), and § 2254(e)(2).  If we concluded that the 
prosecutor never offered race-neutral justifications at step two or that the state court never 
conducted a step-three analysis, an “evidentiary hearing at which the prosecutor might 
rely upon his recollection of the voir dire and make reference to his trial notes would 
seem warranted.”  Holloway, 355 F.3d at 725; accord, e.g., Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 
F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 2010); Brinson, 398 F.3d at 235 (remanding for an evidentiary 
hearing and de novo review where the state court’s failure to proceed to step two was 
contrary to Batson).  The propriety of the evidentiary hearing would further depend on 
whether Saunders diligently sought to amplify the Batson-challenge record in state court.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 
 These disputed issues raise difficult questions best left for another day because 
they are not outcome-determinative here.  Even if we grant Saunders every benefit of the 
doubt—i.e., (1) by assuming that the federal evidentiary hearing was properly held; (2) by 
declining to afford AEDPA deference; and (3) by accepting Saunders’ argument that no 
                                                                                                                                                             
than by allowing state judges to cast their minds back to the state trial.” (citation 
omitted)); Wang v. Withworth, 811 F.2d 952, 956–57 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting a judge’s 
certificate asserting that he granted a mistrial where the trial record plainly showed he 
found a lack of sufficient evidence to convict); Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263, 1267 (4th 
Cir. 1978) (rejecting a trial judge’s certificate on the basis that it was “equivocal”). 
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deference is owed to Judge Hughes’s certificate—we agree fully with the District Court 
that Saunders’s Batson claim fails at step three.  For the reasons set forth in the District 
Court’s de novo analysis, Saunders, 2011 WL 2117559, at *16–17, Saunders has not 
satisfied his burden of showing purposeful discrimination in the prosecutor’s peremptory 
strikes because he has not discredited the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons or further 
demonstrated discriminatory motive.  Cf., e.g., Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 240–63 (describing 
ways in which Batson objectors may show that the opponent’s race-neutral explanations 
are pretextual or implausible).  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment 
denying Saunders’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
